#### Introduction This writing will compare Lera Boroditsky's research article _Sex, Syntax, and Semantics_ (published 2000) to chapter three of Steven Pinker's book _The Language Instinct_ (published 1994). #### Pinker summarized Pinker opens chapter three by describing "the famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic determinism, stating that people’s thoughts are determined by the categories made available by their language, and its weaker version, linguistic relativity, stating that differences among languages cause differences in the thoughts of their speakers." But Pinker quickly rejects it, "there is no scientific evidence that languages dramatically shape their speakers’ ways of thinking."[^1] Pinker then considers psychological research: "The thirty-five years of research from the psychology laboratory is distinguished by how little it has shown. Most of the experiments have tested banal 'weak' versions of the Whorfian hypothesis, namely that words can have some effect on memory or categorization."[^2] In the second half of chapter three, Pinker goes on to alternatively propose, and provide evidence for, a language of thought, or "mentalese." #### Boroditsky summarized In Boroditsky's first experiment, fifteen native English speakers classified a list of 50 animal names and 85 names of non-animal objects as either masculine or feminine and found that their sense of gender for animals correlated with the grammatical genders assigned to the names in Spanish and German (r=.29, p<.05, and r=.43, p<.01). However, no significant correlation held for the non-animals names (r=.04, p=.73, and r=.11, p=.32 respectively). In Boroditsky's second experiment, 25 native Spanish speakers, 16 native German speakers, and 20 English speakers had to remember 24 object–name pairs. After a five-minute distraction, memory across all language speakers was 8% better when the object's grammatical gender (perceived gender for English speakers) was consistent with the name. Boroditsky concludes, "These results suggest that grammatical gender may not be as arbitrary or as purely grammatical as was previously thought." #### Analysis Given the small effect size of Boroditsky's experimental results, as well as the failure to establish a correlation for non-animal names in the first experiment, it appears Pinker's claims have, broadly speaking, not been disproven. Though, there still exists important nuance worth considering. One might object, responding that Boroditsky did in fact find an effect, if small, of thought on language. However, a careful reading will note that Pinker included the hedge "dramatically" in his claim: "there is no scientific evidence that languages _dramatically_ shape their speakers’ ways of thinking." (Emphasis mine.) Pinker's other main claim, his support of a mentalese, is not directly addressed in Boroditsky's article but one might infer that her weak findings offer some support for Pinker on this point. However, the existense of a mentalese does not preclude a neo-Whorfian linguistic relativism— both may simultaneously exist, dynamically influencing each other. Work by researchers such as Boroditsky could help clarify a delicate, but very real, effect of language on thought. While the effect size may be small, proving that language has _some_ effect on language would be meaningful and could help to flesh out the subtleties of human cognition. In Pinker's defense, he may respond that Boroditsky's observed effects are due to other, non-linguistic, causal explanations, such as cultural conditioning. This is especially true given that gender is a social construct. As well as the lack of a significant correlation for non-animal objects, which are harder to anthropomorphize. In fact, in this vein, Pinker dismisses an experiment where subjects have to specify which two of three color chips go together: >I can imagine the subjects thinking to themselves, “Now how on earth does this guy expect me to pick two chips to put together? He didn’t give me any hints, and they’re all pretty similar. Well, I’d probably call those two ‘green’ and that one ‘blue,’ and that seems as good a reason to put them together as any.” In these experiments, language is, technically speaking, influencing a form of thought in some way, but so what?[^3] Overall, in a system as intricate as human cognition, an honest and open intellectualism is necessary. Pinker's bold, if overconfident, writing and quick dismissal of linguistic relativism, in favor of an all-controlling mentalese, could lead to missing out on subtle but crucial details in human cognition. [^1]: Pinker, Steven. The Language Instinct: How The Mind Creates Language (P.S.) (pp. 46-47). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition. [^2]: Pinker, Steven. The Language Instinct: How The Mind Creates Language (P.S.) (p. 55). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition. [^3]: Pinker, Steven. The Language Instinct: How The Mind Creates Language (P.S.) (p. 56). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.