# Introduction This entry focuses on six major questions concerning the rationality and morality of voting: 1. Is it rational for an individual citizen to vote? 2. Is there a moral duty to vote? 3. Are there moral obligations regarding how citizens vote? 4. Is it justifiable for governments to compel citizens to vote? 5. Is it permissible to buy, trade, and sell votes? 6. Who ought to have the right to vote, and should every citizen have an equal vote? # 1. The Rationality of Voting The act of voting has an opportunity cost, taking time and effort from other things. Paradox of voting: since the expected costs of voting appear to exceed the expected benefits, and since voters could instead perform some action with positive overall utility, it's surprising that anyone votes. Major theories on the rationality of voting: - Instrumental theories: voter's goal is to influence or change election outcome, including the "mandate" the winner receives. - Expressive theory: vote to express themselves and their fidelity to groups or ideas. - Alternative theories: - Consumption value: voting for its own sake or showing others they voted. - Moral duty: voting fulfills your moral duty. ## 1.1 Voting to Change the Outcome A person might vote to influence the outcome of an election. Suppose there are two candidates, D and R. Suppose Sally believes D would do a trillion dollars more good than R. If her beliefs are correct, then by hypothesis, it would best if D won. (It's controversial to simplify political outcomes to dollar values, but this serves as illustration.) This still does not yet show it is rational for Sally to vote for D. Instead, it depends on how likely her vote will make a difference. (e.g. A lotto might be worth $200M but that doesn't imply it's rational to buy a lotto ticket.) If Sally's only goal in voting is to change the outcome between two candidates, the expected value of her vote `(𝑈𝑣)` is: ``` 𝑈𝑣 = 𝑝[𝑉(𝐷) − 𝑉(𝑅)] - C ``` where `𝑝` represents the probability that Sally's vote is decisive, `[𝑉(𝐷) − 𝑉(𝑅)]` represents the difference in expected monetary value between candidates and `C` represents the opportunity cost of voting. In short, the value of Sally's vote is the difference between the expected value of the two candidates discounted by her chance of being decisive, minus the opportunity cost of voting. Unless `𝑝[𝑉(𝐷) − 𝑉(𝑅)] > C` then it is, given Sally's stated goals, irrational for her to vote. (e.g. If the expected value difference between two candidates was to save one more life, but voting had a 1 in a billion chance of being decisive, and Sally could instead save a drowning toddler, then voting would not be worthwhile.) Voting estimate probability has two primary models: - The binomial model suggests it will almost never be rational to vote. - The statistical model suggests it will be rational for voters to vote in sufficiently close elections or in swing states. In making these estimates, we assumed voters can reliably and accurately assess candidates. But empirical work generally finds that _most voters are badly informed_. ## 1.2 Voting to Change the "Mandate" "Mandate" refers to the authority and perceived legitimacy, and therefore efficacy, that an elected official receives from the electorate, often interpreted through the margin of their electoral victory. So, proposed response to paradox of voting: voters are not determining a winner, but rather the "mandate" the elected candidate receives. Two problems with mandate argument: 1. Difficult to measure how much a vote influences the mandate, and if it outweighs the cost of voting. 2. Empirical research _supports roundly rejecting the mandate hypothesis_. ## 1.3 Other Reasons to Vote Causal responsibility: Voting may be valued for allowing individuals to be among the "causally efficacious set" of votes. Expressive theory: Voting is a way for individuals to express their identities and commitments, similar to wearing team spirit at a sports event. >This “expressive theory of voting” is untroubled by and indeed partly supported by the empirical findings that most voters are ignorant about basic political facts. The expressive theory is also untroubled by and indeed partly supported by work in political psychology showing that most citizens suffer from significant “intergroup bias”: we tend to automatically form groups, and to be irrationally loyal to and forgiving of our own group while irrationally hateful of other groups. Fulfilling moral duty: It's rational to vote in order to discharge a perceived duty to vote. Most citizens believe their is a duty to vote. # 2. The Moral Obligation to Vote Surveys show that most citizens and philosophers believe their is a moral duty to vote, if if one's preferred candidate has little chance of winning. One might argue there's a duty to vote to protect oneself, to help others, etc. However, as discussed in section 1, individual votes have vanishingly small instrumental value (or disvalue). - Insurance hypothesis: Voting is a way to prevent democracy from collapsing, but the impact of individual votes on this is minimal. A plausible argument for a duty to vote should then not depend on individual votes having significant expected impact. - Complicity in injustice: Citizens have a duty to vote to avoid complicity with injustice, otherwise allowing their representatives to commit injustice. - Generalization argument: If everyone abstained from voting, it would be disastrous, therefore individuals should vote. - However, it matters only that a sufficient number of people vote, so does not follow that everyone out to perform it. - Free-riders: Defenders of duty to vote might argue that non-voters free rider on voters, benefiting from the elected government. Arguments for a duty to vote that do not depend on the controversial assumption that individual votes make a difference: - **The Generalization / Public Goods / Debt to Society Argument**: Citizens who abstain from voting thereby free ride on the provision of good government, or fail to pay their "debts to society." - **The Civic Virtue Argument**: Citizens have a duty to exercise civic virtue, and thus to vote. - **The Complicity Argument**: Citizens have a duty to vote (for just outcomes) in order to avoid being complicit in the injustice their governments commit. Particularity problem: Challenges the idea that voting is the only or best way to fulfill civic duties, suggesting other actions might suffice or be more effective. - Rather than voting, one can engage in civil disobedience, write pamphlets or books, donate money, assassinate criminal political leaders, etc. - Maskivker’s Response: Proposes that citizens should both vote and engage in other forms of civic duty, framing voting as a form of easy aid (deontological duty) for already well-informed individuals. ## 2.1 A General Moral Obligation Not to Vote? Under certain circumstances, individuals might have a duty to abstain from voting. Indifference argument: Voting without preference can unfairly disrupt majority decisions. Ineffective altruism argument: Voting is an ineffective way to help others, as most voters lack the necessary information to make beneficial decisions and individual votes have minimal impact. - e.g. It wouldn't be useful if someone donated to an ineffective charity. - Rather than participating in electoralism, we are instead obligated to pursue effective forms of altruism, such as donating to the Against Malaria Foundation. # 3. Moral Obligations Regarding How One Votes Most people believe in the duty to vote but debate exists about the duty to vote in a particular way. Just as someone can say, "You have the right to have racist attitudes, but you should not," so a person can say, "You have the right to vote for that candidate, but you should not." A theory of voting ethics might include answers to any of the following questions: - Intended Beneficiary of the Vote: Ethical voting might consider whose interests the voter should prioritize— self, group, nation, or world. - Substance of the Vote: Should voters support candidates or policies that ensure just outcomes or vote based on character or strategy? - Epistemic Duties: Are voters required to have a certain level of knowledge or rationality in their voting preferences? ## 3.1 The Expressivist Ethics of Voting Voters often cast ballots to signal loyalty to ideals or groups, rather than influence outcomes. The morality of a vote can be assessed by considering what it expresses about the voter's values and commitments. Determining what a vote expresses is complicated, as it may vary between voters and observers. ## 3.2 The Epistemic Ethics of Voting Voters, similar to doctors and jurors, have certain _epistemic responsibilities_: a duty to make informed and rational decisions because their choices significantly impact society. Voting decisions affect not only the voters themselves but also dissenting minorities, non-voters, and even people in other countries, making voting morally charged. Voting irresponsibly is likened to participating in a harmful group activity, where each individual act, though seemingly insignificant, contributes to a harmful outcome. - e.g. A 100-member firing squad is about to shoot an innocent child. The child will die regardless of what you do. Is it permissible for you to be the 101st to join the firing squad? - This invokes the "clean-hands principle" which suggests individuals have a moral obligation to refrain from participating in collectively harmful activities, including irresponsible voting. >Similarly, with elections, individual votes make no difference. In both cases, the outcome is causally overdetermined. Still, the irresponsible voter is much like a person who volunteers to shoot in the firing squad. Her individual bad vote is of no consequence—just as an individual shot is of no consequence—but she is participating in a collectively harmful activity when she could easily keep her hands clean ![[The Ethics and Rationality of Voting (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).pdf]]