# Introduction Iris Marion Young (1949 - 2006) was an American political philosopher and socialist feminist who focused on the nature of justice and social difference. Central to Young’s philosophy is the recognition of social groups as essential to redressing structural inequalities. She argued for a post-liberal politics of difference, where equal treatment of individuals does not override the redress of group-based oppression. Her writing *Justice and the Politics of Difference* (published 1990) was a seminal work in political theory that criticized prevailing reduction of social justice to that of distributive justice without considering social structures. She later published *Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference* in 2004 which was a more focused analysis into the systemic roots of injustices. # Summary There are at least **two versions of a politics of difference**: 1. Politics of cultural difference (Structural inequality) (e.g. religion, nationality) 2. Politics of positional difference (Culture-based injustice) (e.g. gender, race, disability) Over the last two decades, attention has shifted from the politics of positional difference to a politics of cultural difference. This shift is unfortunate because it tends to **obscure important issues of justice** and because it tends to **limit the framing of difference politics to a liberal paradigm**. We should affirm both approaches but also be clear on the conceptual and practical differences between them. Equating “equality” with “equal treatment” or “sameness” ignores deep material differences that disadvantage members of historically excluded groups. **Substantial equality instead requires attending to, rather than ignoring, such differences.** > Contrary to arguments for cultural neutrality which until recently have been the orthodox liberal stance, the politics of cultural difference argues that public accommodation to and support of cultural difference is compatible with and even required by just institutions. Persons suffer structural inequality when their group social positioning subjects them to institutional limiting of their opportunities for well being. Culture-based injustice occurs when persons are unable to freely express themselves, associate with others via shared practices, socialize their children, or when their group bears significant economic or political cost in pursuing a distinctive way of life. In the first two sections, Young lays out and distinguishes a politics of cultural differences and a politics of positional differences. In the third section, Young how recent political theory tends to narrow considerations of a politics of difference to a liberal paradigm. This has at least three unfortunate consequences: 1. A politics of cultural differences and its focus on liberty does not sufficiently highlight issues of structural inequalities. 2. The politics of cultural differences tends to ignore civil society as a crucial site for working on injustice because of its focus on what state policy should allow, forbid, or remain silent about 3. Discussion of the politics of cultural difference too often tend to elevate particular group based standards as normative for a whole polity without specifically noticing this normalizing move. (For example, female genital mutilation, forced marriages, and dress codes.) ## I. Politics of Positional Difference Structural groups are formed through structural processes that position individuals differently along social axes (such as gender or race) that leads to varied levels of status, power, and wealth. Structural injustice is defined more by structural vulnerabilities to harm and limitations to well-being for a group of people rather than individual wealth or power. The politics of positional difference argues that it is necessary to explicitly recognize group differences in order to justly rectify structural inequality. Without such recognition, prevailing social norms and past history will tend to perpetuate these inequalities. Socio-economic class is a prime example of structural grouping, illustrating that one’s social position extends beyond income level to include one’s role in labor division, decision-making hierarchies, and group-specific fashion and taste. Similarly, disability, gender, and institutional racism are other examples of group difference. > The politics of positional difference argues that public and private institutional policies and practices that interpret equality as requiring being blind to group differences are not likely to undermine persistent structural group differences and often reinforce them. Even in the absence of explicitly discriminatory laws and rules, adherence to body aesthetic, struggle over power, and other dynamics of differentiation, will tend to reproduce given categorical inequalities unless institutions take explicit action to counteract such tendencies. Thus to remove unjust inequality it is necessary explicitly to recognize group difference and either compensate for disadvantage, revalue some attributes, positions or actions, or take special steps to meet needs and empower members of disadvantaged groups. ### A. Disability as Structural Inequality Theoretical writings on social justice have traditionally neglected disability, treating it as some outlier. This is simply wrong considering how widespread disability is. In fact, centering disability in social justice would teach us much about structural inequality, normalization, and stigmatization. Philosopher Brian Barry has attacked all versions of a politics of difference and instead defends a merit-based system where all should have the opportunity to compete for positions of advantage and only the most qualified should win. Under this system, it is taken as an unfortunate but nevertheless acceptable outcome that disabled persons will be expected to lose more often. This is a common opinion and the disability rights movement has challenged this standard liberal position. Many in the disability rights movement assert that the problem is not with the attributes of individuals but rather the *lack of fit* between the attributes of certain persons and the social and cultural environment. The built environment privileges people who can walk, see, and hear within the “normal range” of functioning. This constitutes a structural injustice where disabled people unfairly suffer limited opportunities for living full, rewarding lives. Disability is a prime illustration of positional difference, where social structures, norms and difference-blind policies perpetuate injustice. Unlike cultural groups, the grouping of disabled people is structurally created from the outside based on deviations from normative assumptions. > Many people with disabilities unfairly suffer limitation to their opportunities for developing capacities, earning a living through satisfying work, having a rewarding social life, and living as autonomous adults. A difference blind liberalism can offer only very limited remedy for this injustice. It is no response to the person who moves in a wheel chair or who tries to enter a courtroom accessible only by stairs that the state treats all citizens in the same way. The blind engineer derives little solace from an employer who assures him that they make the same computer equipment available to all employees. The opportunities of people with disabilities can be made equal only if others specifically notice their differences, cease regarding them as unwanted deviance from accepted norms and unacceptable costs to efficient operations, and take affirmative measures to accommodate the specific capacities of individuals so that they can function, as all of us should be able to, at their best and with dignity. ### B. Racial Inequality ### C. Gender Inequality ## II. The Politics of Cultural Difference This section delves into the Politics of Cultural Difference, contrasting it with the Politics of Positional Difference discussed earlier. It references Will Kymlicka’s “Multicultural Citizenship” as a seminal exposition of this theory, which centers on the recognition and accommodation of societal cultures, embodied in distinct nations or ethnicities, within a state. Unlike structural groups, these groups are defined by shared societal culture and face unique challenges in maintaining their cultural expressions amidst a dominant or majority culture The politics of cultural difference challenges the notion of a single culture within a polity and advocates for the recognition and accommodation of diverse cultural groups. The discussion heavily references Will Kymlicka’s theory, exploring the dynamics between ethnic and national groups within multicultural politics, and critiques the concept of overly bounded societal culture. It also touches on the importance of recognizing both positional and cultural differences in addressing structural inequalities and promoting justice, concluding with a comparison to Nancy Fraser’s framework of redistribution and recognition. ## III. Critical Limits to the Politics of Cultural Difference ## IV. Conclusion This essay has aimed to clarify differences in approaches to debates about justice: when and how justice calls for attending to rather than ignoring social group differences. It’s unfortunate that the politics of cultural difference has received more attention than the politics of positional difference for several reasons: 1. It tends to narrow the groups of concern to ethnic, national, and religious groups. 2. It limits the issues of justice to those concerned with freedom and autonomy more than equal opportunity for people to live a life of well-being. 3. It tends to limit politics to shaping state policy and reintroduce normalizing discourses. The purpose of these arguments have been to encourage political theorists to refocus their attention to group differences generated from structural power, the division of labor, and constructions of the normal and the deviant while continuing to also reflect on issues of cultural difference. _____ Young thinks the political apparatus is made up not just of the state, but also of civil society which is underappreciated. Thinking about cultural difference can, for example, erase the oppressive realities of racism. The differences in cultural difference are intrinsic. For example, the Spanish language and English language are inherently different. Positional difference, on the other hand, differ based off of social dynamics. For example, women being lesser or people of color being lesser are not inherent qualities. Young thinks the paradigm of cultural difference obscures issues of positional difference. Young doesn’t think positional difference is always bad or should be extinguished. Rather we should tend to how we view them and how that might be oppressive.