Annette Baier is a prominent figure in contemporary philosophy, known for her contributions to moral philosophy and feminist ethics, particularly her feministic perspective emphasizing trust, emotions, and interpersonal relationships in moral reasoning. Born in 1929 in New Zealand, Baier’s academic journey took her through the University of Otago and the University of Oxford, where she cultivated an interest in the works of David Hume and later moral philosophers. In “The Need for More Than Justice”, Baier argues that traditional justice theories, heavily influenced by Kant and Rawls, are insufficient as they neglect the vital elements of trust and care. Traditional justice theories lack a focus on interpersonal dependencies, a perspective heavily influenced by feminist thought and the work of Carol Gilligan. She advocates for an ‘ethics of care,’ which emphasizes emotional connections and interdependence, challenging the traditional prioritization of autonomy and impartial justice. Baier’s work is a call for more inclusive moral philosophy that recognizes the importance of caregiving roles and integrates emotions into ethical reasoning, offering a more holistic understanding of justice that incorporates trust and care as fundamental components. ___ ### *In A Different Voice* (1982) by Carol Gilligan, Advocating women's unique moral perspective In 1982, Carol Gilligan published *In A Different Voice*, a groundbreaking word in moral psychology and feminist ethics. In it she critiques the predominant male perspectives, particularly Lawrence Kohlberg's model of moral development, for devaluing women's ethical perspectives. Gilligan claims that women have a distinct moral voice, emphasizing care, relationships, and interconnectedness. Gilligan states there are two perspectives on moral and social issues we alternate between: 1. The justice perspective (more masculine) 2. The care perspective (more feminine) According to Gilligan, women are more unlikely to take *only* the justice perspective. (Gilligan avoided giving an explanation as to why. She only cared that this simply is the case and deserves to be investigated.) Rawls claims that justice is the 'first' virtue of social institutions. This is emblematic of the liberal, often patriarchal, ethical tradition. ##### Kohlberg’s model of moral development (Liberal, justice, rules) Lawrence Kohlberg developed a framework of moral development and found that men tended to be more morally "advanced." He determined this by subjecting people to moral tests, usually Utilitarian or Kantian in flavor. Kohlberg’s levels of moral development, following Piaget and [[Kant’s moral philosophy]] as developed by John Rawls: 1. Pre-conventional: Obeying authority 2. Conventional: Fitting in with a group 3. Post-conventional: Critically evaluating rules based on respect for individual autonomy ##### Gilligan’s model of moral development (Care, interdependence) Carol Gilligan noticed that women typically express their morality in a different voice. Her research suggested that women view moral development less in terms of autonomy and rights, but more in terms of care, interconnection, and interdependence. >'women perceive and construe social reality differently from men, and that these differences center around experiences of attachment and separation ... because women's sense of integrity appears to be intertwined with an ethics of care, so that to see themselves as women is to see themselves in a relationship of connexion, the major changes in women's lives would seem to involve changes in the understanding and activities of care' (D. V., 171). Kohlberg’s model is a progression of mutual *respect*. (Independence, Kantian) Gilligan’s model is a progression of mutual *care*. (Interdependence) >\[…] in Kohlberg's stages, a progression in the understanding, not of mutual care, but of mutual respect, where this has its Kantian overtones of distance, even of some fear for the respected, and where personal autonomy and independence, rather than more satisfactory interdependence, are the paramount values. ###### Kantian / liberal alienation The Kantian (and Rawlsian / liberal) version is alienating similar to the Marxist sense. While it’s focus on justice may grant things like kept contracts, due process, equal opportunity, and free speech, none of these focus on or guarantee a sense of community or meaning. >Their rights, and respect for rights, are quite compatible with very great misery, and misery whose causes are not just individual misfortunes and psychic sickness, but social and moral impoverishment. ###### Gilligan’s model echoes Hegelianism Gilligan advocates for a community-oriented approach, echoing older, religion-linked moral frameworks which is why some may find it retrograde. However, it seems to have much in common with Hegelian models of moral maturity and social health. ### Baier on the differences between Gilligan's moral maturity & the orthodoxy >Let me try to summarize the main differences, as I see them, between on the one hand Gilligan's version of moral maturity and the sort of social structures that would encourage, express and protect it, and on the other the orthodoxy she sees herself to be challenging. I shall from now on be giving my own interpretation of the significance of her challenges, not merely reporting them. ###### Challenging Western individualism, expanding it to accommodate interdependence Gilligan's most obvious challenge is of Western individualism. Noninterference for the relatively powerless can amount to neglect, and even between equals can be isolating & alienating. Gilligan's model sees identity as expanding through relationships and interconnectedness, contrasting with Rawls’s idea of individuals following their rational life plans possibly devoid of close associations. | Illustrating individualities | |--|---------------------------------------|--| | **Liberal view** | From a liberal perspective, an individual's engagement in community service or social activism might be seen as a personal choice that reflects their individual values and interests, separate from their core identity. | Imagine a doctor who views their role strictly as treating individual patients, emphasizing personal health and autonomy. | | **Gilligan's view** | Gilligan would view such community engagement as a fundamental aspect of the individual’s identity. Their response to the interconnectedness of society, their empathy towards others, and their actions to address communal needs are seen as defining features of their individuality. In Gilligan's model, such engagement is not just a personal choice but a reflection of how the individual's identity is shaped by and contributes to their relationships and connections within the community. | Imagine the doctor becomes involved in public health advocacy, recognizing the interconnectedness of health within the community. | ###### Need for cooperative societal structure Gilligan's model implies a need for a societal structure that supports and expresses communal values and care ethics, it can not be just an optional add-on. This necessitates a shift from a society dominated by individualistic, liberal values, where communal ethics are merely tolerated or exploited, to one that integrates and values these communal ethics at its core. ###### Liberal moral complicity in oppression The liberal moral tradition, while advocating for rights and autonomy, often justified the oppression of people such as women and slaves who did the domestic work. Oppressed groups eventually used the language of liberal rights. But in transcending the values of the Kantians, we should not forget their oppressive history and be critical of their patriarchal roots. >The long-unnoticed moral proletariat were the domestic workers, mostly female. Rights have usually been for the privileged. According to Kant, women were incapable of legislation, not fit to vote, that they needed the guidance of more 'rational' males. >But where Kant concludes— 'so much the worse for women,' we can conclude-'so much the worse for the male fixation on the special skill of drafting legislation, for the bureaucratic mentality of rule worship, and for the male exaggeration of the importance of independence over mutual interdependence.' In Rawls' theory, a key role is played by the idea of the 'head of a household.' Of course, Rawls doesn't specify whether this head is the father or the mother. >Traces of the old patriarchal poison still remain in even the best contemporary moral theorizing. Few may actually say that women's place is in the home, but there is much muttering, when unemployment figures rise, about how the relatively recent flood of women into the work force complicates the problem, as if it would be a good thing if women just went back home whenever unemployment rises, to leave the available jobs for the men. ### Three more differences between the Kantian liberals (usually contractarians) and their critics >Exploitation aside, why would women, once liberated, not be content to have their version of morality merely tolerated? Why should they not see themselves as voluntarily, for their own reasons, taking on more than the liberal rules demand, while having no quarrel with the content of those rules themselves, nor with their remaining the only ones that are expected to be generally obeyed? To see why, we need to move on to three more differences... 1. Kantian morals narrowly emphasize relationships between equals; care ethics address the reality of unequal relationships. 2. Kantian morals elevate freedom of choice; care ethics recognizes unchosen obligations, such as family and community. 3. Kantians prioritize rationality and intellect; care ethics recognize emotions as complementary and constituting and more holistic morality. ###### Kantian liberals ignore power imbalances and mask moral complexities Kantian liberals, often contractarians, typically prioritize regulating relationships between equals. This approach has been dominant since the philosophies of Kant and Hobbes. In contrast, relationships involving clear power imbalances (e.g., parent-child, doctor-patient, state-citizen) are less emphasized and often approached by artificially promoting the weaker party to a status of virtual equality. This pretense of equality may lead to protection of the weaker but it masks the moral complexities inherent in power imbalances. Institutions that structure these relationships (like families, schools, hospitals) should be designed with a realistic acceptance of power disparities and interdependencies. >A more realistic acceptance of the fact that we begin as helpless children, that at almost every point of our lives we deal with both the more and the less helpless, that equality of power and interdependency, between two persons or groups, is rare and hard to recognize when it does occur, might lead us to a more direct approach to questions concerning the design of institutions structuring these relationships between unequals (families, schools, hospitals, armies) and of the morality of our dealings with the more and the less powerful. ###### Liberal morality, lacking care, is insufficient and unsustainable The liberal rules of morality are not a good "minimal set" because they prepare people only to be self-interested, ignoring the needs of others. A comprehensive moral theory must necessarily care for the less powerful, particularly future generations. For a moral theory to be sustainable, it must ensure the well-being of future persons. It can't just offload that care as an optional charity left only for those with a taste for it. The survival of humans and Earth depends on care for the young and environment. >So far I have discussed three reasons women have not to be content to pursue their own values within the framework of the liberal morality. The first was its dubious record. The second was its inattention to relations of inequality or its pretence of equality. The third reason is its exaggeration of the scope of choice, or its inattention to unchosen relations. ###### Moral obligations are often unchosen The liberal moral framework assumes moral obligations arise from freely chosen associations. Not all morally important relationships can or should be freely chosen. (e.g. parent-child, child-nation.) In light of this, justice as a virtue should be seen as only one aspect of a broader moral framework. Equally important is the virtue of care, which ensures each new generation is prepare for life. >Contract soon ceases to seem the paradigm source of moral obligation once we attend to parental responsibility, and justice as a virtue of social institutions will come to seem at best only first equal with the virtue, whatever its name, that ensures that each new generation is made appropriately welcome and prepared for their adult lives. ###### Emotions, not just reason, play in moral development David Hume and other Western moral theorists have noted that humans are inherently social beings, born into families which are our first societies. This highlights the important role emotions, not just reason, play in moral development. Primary caretakers need to love their children, not just dispassionately control their emotions. Laurence Thomas's work, which argues for the importance of integrating virtues that involve emotional and rational capacities into our understanding of morality. Thomas, like Gilligan, emphasizes the formative role of childhood experiences and parental love in moral development. ###### The best moral theory must include women and men, justice and care. >It is clear, I think, that the best moral theory has to be a cooperative product of women and men, has to harmonize justice and care. The morality it theorizes about is after all for all persons, for men and for women, and will need their combined insights.