Sandra Harding is an American philosopher of feminist and postcolonial theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science. #### Standpoint Theory Standpoint theory both _enables and limits_ what we can know; it doesn't _determine_ what we know. First-wave **standpoint theory** (or, standpoint epistemology) emerged in the 1970's and 80's, spearheaded by feminist philosophers such as Harding. It aimed to challenge conventional notions of objectivity and neutrality in scientific inquiry by foregrounding the perspectives of marginalized people, particularly women. Standpoint theory posits that marginalized people have a unique and valuable vantage point that _enables_ (notably, not guaranteeing) a more objective knowledge. Standpoint theory drew heavily from Marxism, particularly the idea that the proletariat has a unique epistemic position, as well as Hegel's master-slave dialectic. Second-wave standpoint theory emerged in the 1980's and 90's and evolved to be more inclusive of a broader range of social positions (race, socioeconomic class, etc.), and critiqued the first wave's tendency to essentialize / homogenize women's experiences (i.e. white, middle class, Western). Theorists and activists also developed the related concept of intersectionality, explaining how intersecting oppressions contribute to complex power dynamics. Feminist standpoint theorists make three principal claims: 1. Knowledge is socially situated. 2. Marginalized groups are socially situated in ways that make it more possible for them to be aware of things and as questions relative to the non-marginalized. 3. Research, particularly that focuses on power relations, should begin with the lives of the marginalized. #### Harding on Scientific Realism Scientific realism is the position that science describes reality as it truly is, independent of our perceptions, and that the theories and entities science discusses (e.g. electrons, gravitational waves) are real and exist independent of the observer. Harding is not a scientific realist in the traditional sense. She critiques traditional realism because it claims to offer objective, neutral truths about the world. Our sociality doesn't make objectivity impossible. In fact, the opposite is true. Science has left out the perspectives of marginalized people and so has resulted in sexist, racist, and classist theories. The idea of the objective, detached (usually, white and male) scientist is a myth. Harding doesn't reject truth or objectivity outright. Rather, Harding calls for a reformulation of how we think about them. #### Successor Science Harding advocates for a "**successor science**," a science that incorporates feminist principles and critiques the biases of traditional, patriarchal science Successor science borrows critical tools from postmodernism (such as the critique of power and traditional knowledge structures) but **rejects postmodernism’s full relativism and deconstruction of science altogether**. #### Strong Objectivity Harding advocates for "**strong objectivity**," which requires acknowledging the social position of the researcher and the influence of power structures on scientific inquiry. Strong objectivity then advocates for an actively self-aware, transparent, and reflexive approach to knowledge production. In contrast, weak objectivity refers to the traditional understanding of objectivity in science, which assumes a neutral, detached observer. In Harding's view, objectivity is not a binary proposition. Rather, objectivity is a continuum that is improved by including a broad diversity of perspectives, particularly from marginalized backgrounds. For example, in traditional research on heart disease, scientists might study primarily male patients, assuming the findings apply equally to women. This would be an example of weak objectivity. A strong objectivity approach would involve critical reflection, recognize how gender bias shapes understanding of heart disease, and include more diverse populations. #### Harding on the "Instability" of Categories Harding argues that when feminists apply traditional intellectual frameworks (Marxism, psychoanalysis, empiricism, hermeneutics, deconstructionism, etc.) to women's experiences, they often break down or need to be reinterpreted, because they were not designed with women's experiences in mind. Harding suggests embracing this instability because it reflects the changing nature of social and political reality. The "instability" of categories allows for more dynamic and inclusive feminist theorizing that can adapt to ongoing transformations in social life. #### Key terms from Harding's essay - **Archimedean standpoint**: An objective, detached viewpoint that claims to be free of bias, which Harding critiques as an illusion in traditional science and philosophy. - **Epistemic privilege**: Certain groups, especially marginalized ones, may have better access to to knowledge about structures because of their social position. - **Bifurcated consciousness**: The experience of navigating two different social worlds (the dominant and marginalized community), offering unique perspectives. - **Relational personality structures**: Women's identities are often formed and understood through relationships, in contrast to more individualistic or autonomous models. - **Successor science**: A new kind of science that incorporates feminist principles and critiques the biases of traditional, patriarchal science. - **Oppositional consciousness**: A critical stance taken by marginalized groups in opposition to dominant ideologies, allowing to to challenge established norms. - **Totalizing theories**: Theories that claim to comprehensively explain everything, often excluding diverse perspectives and oversimplifying complex social realities. Sandra Harding critiques the **culture versus nature** and **gender versus sex** dichotomies, arguing that these oppositions are deeply embedded in **Western thought** and have harmful implications for both science and feminist theory. In these dualisms, **masculinity** is aligned with culture (reason, objectivity, mind) and **femininity** with nature (emotions, subjectivity, body), reinforcing a **power imbalance** where culture must dominate nature. This framework, Harding explains, has been a major target of **feminist critique** because it oversimplifies and marginalizes women’s experiences. However, Harding also points out that this **dualistic thinking reappears** in feminist discourses about **gender and sex**, particularly when attempting to separate the social (gender) from the biological (sex). While separating these aspects is important for challenging **biological determinism**, which claims that gender differences arise solely from sex differences, it risks oversimplification. New research shows that **sexual identity and desire** are highly **plastic**, not rigidly determined by biology, challenging both biological and cultural determinism. Harding identifies two problems for feminist theory: 1. **Embodying Difference**: Feminist theory needs to acknowledge that **female embodiment** (e.g., menstruation, childbirth) differs from male embodiment, but without reinforcing **biological determinism** that ties women to fixed roles based on biology. 2. **The Power of Ideology**: The **culture vs. nature dichotomy** isn’t just an intellectual concept but an **ideological structure** that shapes public policy, social practices, and disciplines (e.g., social vs. natural sciences). Even though these dichotomies are empirically false, they continue to structure how we live and think. Harding suggests that while we must critique these dualisms, we cannot ignore them since they **actively shape social reality**. Feminists must maintain a **balance**: recognizing biological differences without allowing them to dictate **destiny**, and continuing to critique the cultural assumptions that shape policy and practice. **Illustrative Example:** Consider **workplace policies regarding pregnancy and reproductive health**. Feminists might argue that recognizing **biological differences** (e.g., pregnancy) is necessary to create supportive policies, like paid maternity leave or protections for reproductive health in hazardous work environments. At the same time, they must avoid reinforcing the idea that women are defined **solely** by their biology (e.g., assuming women can’t work in certain roles due to reproductive risks), which would be a form of **biological determinism**. This reflects Harding’s tension between needing to acknowledge differences in policy while critiquing the cultural and biological frameworks that limit women’s potential based on these differences.